How much has France given to Ukraine?

Since the start of the conflict, how much has France given to Ukraine? It is impossible to know precisely. It depends on what one counts, on the difference between aid promised and aid actually disbursed, on the breadth of the base chosen. At least four figures can be put forward. None is false, but none is completely true. A roll-call of the figures.

Aid to Ukraine: between €6.5 and €26 billion.

The French debate on aid to Ukraine tears itself apart over figures on which no one agrees. It is impossible really to know how much France has paid: it varies according to what is counted. And the range is very wide, since it runs from €6.5 to €26 billion.

The government puts forward one amount; the Kiel Institute, which tracks European aid and is recognised for its rigour, publishes another. Commentators add up a third. Some amounts are public, but the exact perimeter is very difficult to determine. By bringing together all the available data, here is what can be established.

The first two figures are French and cover only the military component. The next two are German and include the civilian component.

The official French figure

There is no French parliamentary report devoted to support for Ukraine. The costing is lodged in a chapter of the annual report to Parliament on arms exports, and the detail of the equipment delivered is transmitted only to the defence committees of the two chambers. The government assumes this choice of non-transparency, on the grounds that a real-time publication would inform Moscow about the state of French stocks. It is true that, on this subject, keeping aid and donated weaponry out of the public eye is a necessity to guarantee the security of Ukraine and of the French armed forces.

« Presidential announcements are often ceilings — ‘up to three billion’ — subsequently presented as secured amounts. »

A problem of accounting arises in particular for the equipment supplied. If France gives Ukraine a VAB from the 1990s, at what value should it be entered into the aid total? At its initial purchase price? At the price that will have to be paid to buy its replacement? (I hand over a VAB and therefore must buy a Griffon to replace it — do I count that at the price of the Griffon?) Or else, as for a private individual’s vehicle, at its initial price minus a depreciation for use (x% less according to the years of use). These three methods of calculation all have their justification. None is false. But depending on the method chosen, the final amount of the aid will be different.

France has a single official document that sets out the valuation method: the National Assembly information report, which dates from November 2023. That was already three years ago — an eternity on the scale of this war. In that report, France uses the budgetary replacement cost: a VAB handed over is valued at the price of the Griffon that will replace it. The government explicitly rules out the acquisition value, « meaningless years later », and the book value, deemed arbitrary and variable from one country to another.

This figure does not measure a spending of the financial year, but a future spending, spread out until at least 2027. The 2026 report concedes it: the €940 million of 2025 are not comparable to replacement costs, since a reconditioned VAB is not a brand-new Griffon. So this is counted as aid to Ukraine, but France would in any case have ended up parting with its VABs and buying Griffons. So it is indeed aid to Ukraine, but it is not spending undertaken specifically for Ukraine: the spending would have been made anyway, even without the war, since the army renews its equipment. There is therefore a further distinction here: aid to Ukraine is not spending generated specifically for Ukraine.

The breakdown of the aid has been published only once. At the end of 2023, the same report gave €3.2 billion gross, divided between €1.7 billion of arms transfers, €300 million of training, €200 million of a special fund and €1 billion of contribution to the European Peace Facility. It specified that this gross cost would be reduced by about €500 million of European reimbursements.

The 2025 report to Parliament shows €8.6 billion cumulative at the end of 2024, but the 2026 one shows €6.5 billion cumulative at the end of 2025. Where did the two billion euros go in a year? The calculation perimeter is probably not the same, but this is not explained in the reports. As we can see, even with the official reports it is very difficult to count how much France has given.

The Kiel Institute: a different method of calculation

The Kiel Institute’s Ukraine Support Tracker reports aid to Ukraine from public announcements. It is therefore a different mode of calculation, since an announcement does not necessarily result in spending actually carried out. It also counts the equipment supplied at its market price, applying a devaluation according to inflation. According to this method of tracking, France has given €7.9 billion of aid, which corresponds to 0.3% of its GDP. That is far behind Denmark (3.49%) and Norway (2.83%). Germany and the United Kingdom are at the same level (0.86%).

But the Kiel Institute does not count the training of Ukrainian soldiers, which Paris includes in its total. Here too, we see that the perimeter differs according to the way of counting. As for the European Peace Facility, Kiel counts it under « European institutions », whereas Paris counts it under its own. Once again a question of perimeter and of base.

The problem of the money that passes through Brussels

Another difficulty in the accounting is that part of the money passes through Brussels, then goes to Ukraine. But this sum is given by the member states. It therefore becomes difficult to trace in order to attribute its source.

The European Peace Facility reimburses the member states that hand over equipment. But here too, the very nature of the equipment changes from one country to another. France gave complex equipment, such as the Caesar guns, while other states, notably in Eastern Europe, emptied their stocks of equipment dating from the Soviet era. It is therefore difficult to value it financially and thus to know precisely how to reimburse the states.

How is humanitarian aid to be counted?

That is the debate on the military component. But there is another type of contribution: the civilian and humanitarian component. Thus, in May 2024, French civilian aid reached €2.2 billion. There is also an amount of €400 million in loans guaranteed via the French Development Agency (AFD). The other difficulty in the accounting is to distinguish gifts from loans — knowing that some loans will not be repaid. How, too, to count aid to refugees, the schooling of Ukrainian children, social benefits? How to value equipment donated when it dates from the 1990s or 2000s? And then there are the data that are not public, because it is a sensitive subject and one does not wish Russia to know the amount of the aid and the type of equipment supplied. A wholly understandable « war secret ».

It is therefore impossible to say precisely how much France has given to Ukraine since February 2022. As we can see, one can arrive at very different figures, and the difference in the bases taken into account can perfectly well be justified.

If we take the highest figure, that is €26 billion over four years (2022-2025), that comes to €6.5 billion a year. By way of comparison, the « Ecology and sustainable development » section of the French budget in 2025 amounts to €25 billion of annual spending. As does security (police and gendarmerie). This means that aid to Ukraine counts for little in France’s general budget.

One can abolish aid to Ukraine to make savings. But given the smallness of the amount, that will not change much in the state budget. The total state budget, in 2026, is €750 billion. So aid to Ukraine, taking the upper range of €6 billion a year, is 0.8% of the state budget.

National Education is €89 billion of spending in 2026. Debt repayment is €63 billion in 2026. Here too, taking the upper range of aid to Ukraine, it represents 9.6% of the annual debt figure. A not-insignificant sum, but not an immense treasure either.

As we can see, defining precisely the amount of the aid given to Ukraine is almost impossible. But to say that this aid will solve the problem of French public finances is false.

Main sources

— National Assembly, information report no. 1840 on military support for Ukraine, 8 November 2023 — the only complete breakdown published and the only account of the valuation method. — Ministry of the Armed Forces, reports to Parliament 2024, 2025 and 2026 on arms exports, chapter « Measures in favour of Ukraine ». — List of equipment delivered to Ukraine, Ministry of the Armed Forces, 4 March 2024. — Senate, information report no. 513 on the financing of operational deployments, 8 April 2026. — Senate, report no. 12 on the extra-budgetary financial commitments of the European Union, 8 October 2025. — Kiel Institute, Ukraine Support Tracker, methodology documentation and research note of June 2024. — Cour des comptes (Court of Auditors), flash audit on the reception and care of Ukrainian refugees in 2022, February 2023. — Council of the European Union and European Commission, pages devoted to the European Peace Facility and support for Ukraine.