The New York Times, Qatar and the Making of Media Indulgence

• Qatar’s relatively high ranking by Reporters Without Borders (75th worldwide) sits oddly with the restrictions it imposes on journalists.

• Through the case of New York Times reporter Declan Walsh, Arnaud Lacheret examines the making of a media indulgence toward Doha.

By Arnaud Lacheret. Associate Professor at SKEMA Business School

This apparent leniency can also be explained by the image Doha has succeeded in building in parts of the Western press: that of a modernising actor and mediator, even though Qatar remains one of the main supporters of political Islam, whose rise to power has often been accompanied by tighter restrictions on the press, from Muslim Brotherhood-led Egypt to Ennahda’s Tunisia. This leniency is thought-provoking.

The New York Times, a symbol of journalistic excellence, is not immune to controversy. While its reporting often embodies an ideal of rigour and impartiality, some editorial choices raise questions. The case of Declan Walsh, a prominent figure at the newspaper, illustrates a drift: over the years, his publications reveal a troubling closeness to Qatar’s interests, blurring the line between investigative journalism and the relay of influence.

A seasoned journalist at The New York Times since 2012, Declan Walsh has made a name for himself through hard-hitting investigations and an uncompromising style. Expelled from Pakistan in 2013 over reporting deemed too critical, he narrowly avoided arrest in Cairo in 2017 thanks to the intervention of the Irish authorities. His career, crowned by prestigious distinctions including the Robert F. Kennedy Journalism Award in 2019 for his reporting on Yemen and the Cornelius Ryan Award in 2021 for The Nine Lives of Pakistan, reflects genuine professional recognition.

The New York Times Middle East correspondent from 2015 to 2020, and Africa correspondent since then, Declan Walsh nevertheless displays a pro-Qatar inclination that raises questions about the newspaper’s ethical standards. This inclination takes two forms: highly favourable coverage of Doha and consistently harsh treatment of its regional rivals, particularly the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia.

A pro-Qatar inclination

The first signs of this tendency appeared in 2017, when five Arab countries, led by Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, imposed a blockade on Qatar. From the outset of the crisis, Walsh portrayed the emirate as a victimised nation, resilient in the face of aggression by its powerful neighbours: “Qatar has been under a kind of siege for a month, but so far this immensely wealthy Persian Gulf nation is feeling little pain” (Wealthy Qatar Weathers Siege, but Personal and Political Costs Grow, 2 July 2017). Within a few months, he published a series of articles in which Qatar was systematically depicted as a bastion of resistance in the face of injustice.

His articles establish a self-reinforcing narrative: that of a heroic country targeted because of its independence and attachment to sovereignty. When the International Court of Justice “dealt a symbolic blow to the trade and diplomatic embargo imposed by the United Arab Emirates and its allies”, Walsh stressed the significance of the ruling, presenting it as a victory of law over arbitrariness (Court Orders U.A.E. to Let Expelled Qataris Back In, 23 July 2018).

He also reinforced the image of Qatar as a haven of tolerance and refuge, contrasting it with the authoritarian regimes of other Gulf states. This “welcoming attitude is precisely what has recently infuriated Qatar’s much larger neighbours and plunged the Middle East into one of its most dramatic diplomatic confrontations” (Qatar Opens Its Doors to All, to the Dismay of Some, 16 July 2017).

Yet this narrative leaves out many sensitive issues documented by major international media outlets. Allegations of terrorist financing have been recurrent. In 2013, the U.S. State Department noted that private donations from Gulf countries constituted “a major source of funding for Sunni terrorist groups, particularly in Syria”. Washington has also pointed to Qatar’s “permissive environment” for terrorist fundraising. More recently, Doha has been criticised for its ties with Hamas, whose political bureau it hosts.

Suspicions of political interference are also numerous. The Qatargate scandal notably revealed Qatar’s alleged involvement in influence campaigns targeting members of the European Parliament, raising questions about the extent of its influence in Western centres of power.

While the 2022 World Cup drew intense scrutiny from journalists in the region, Declan Walsh mentioned it in only one article, published three years before the event. He described the tournament as “a huge coup for a tiny country of 300,000 people, demonstrating its ambition to project itself onto the world stage through its gas wealth” (Persian Gulf Standoff Starts to Thaw on the Soccer Field, 19 December 2019). He mentioned neither the thousands of migrant workers reported dead according to some estimates, nor controversies over working conditions, nor air-conditioned stadiums built in the desert.

In 2018, during the Mediterranean Dialogues in Rome, Walsh interviewed Qatari Foreign Minister Mohammed Al-Thani. Far from his usual incisive approach, he adopted a cautious posture and avoided sensitive questions concerning Qatar’s relations with the United States or Iran. The interview was even promoted by Qatar’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

His X account confirms this tendency. Across 50 posts published between 2013 and 2024, each reflects a marked indulgence towards Qatar.

5 June 2018. “I don’t understand the claim that Hifter’s advances in Libya last summer were the result of Qatar’s paralysis. UAE support, yes. But Qatar withdrew most of its support from Libya at the end of 2015 at the request of the United States. The quartet’s claim that it was a major player in Libya was outdated from the start.”

1 November 2018. “While its rivals, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, are bogged down in the Yemen war, Qatar is seeking to distinguish itself by presenting itself as an absolute monarchy with a better human-rights record. Doha has also introduced labour-law reforms this year.”

19 December 2018. “Qatari milk, Qatari tissues, even Qatari soap: @NYTBen in Doha on how Qataris are coping with the Saudi-Emirati embargo, 18 months after it began. ‘We’ve moved on,’ they say.”

18 July 2020. “I inhaled this story: Qatar’s prince and his years studying in Los Angeles.”

An anti-Emirati and anti-Saudi fixation aligned with Qatar’s own

Declan Walsh reserves very different treatment for Qatar’s neighbours. Between 2015 and 2020, he produced 12 articles and 70 tweets exclusively critical of the United Arab Emirates, without comparable criticism of Doha. The asymmetry is striking: the UAE is systematically portrayed as a destabilising actor, while Qatar escapes comparable scrutiny.

Between 2019 and 2024, Walsh criticises the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia in all 12 articles in which they are mentioned. He describes the UAE as a “rogue state”, portraying it as a country willing to manipulate the international order to defend its interests (How a U.S. Ally Uses Aid as a Cover in War, 21 September 2024).

Since April 2023, he has focused much of his attention on the UAE’s alleged involvement in Sudan. Sixty-seven of his 109 most recent posts deal with that war while consistently mentioning the UAE’s role. He describes a covert operation conducted “under a humanitarian guise”, in which “the United Arab Emirates is running an elaborate covert operation to support one faction in Sudan’s devastating war, supplying powerful weapons and drones, treating wounded fighters and evacuating the most serious cases to one of its military hospitals” (Talking Peace in Sudan, the U.A.E. Secretly Fuels the Fight, 29 September 2023).

Regarding the blockade against Qatar, Walsh again portrays the UAE as an instigator of regional crises, often allied with Saudi Arabia in a quest for strategic dominance. He describes a coordinated campaign aimed at isolating Doha, with demands deemed unrealistic, such as severing ties with Tehran, as well as symbolic manoeuvres designed to weaken the Qatari emir. This narrative forms part of a broader critique of the UAE and Saudi Arabia, portrayed as powers seeking to reshape the regional order to their advantage.

Here again, his X account, followed by around 155,000 users, illustrates this anti-Emirati crusade. Across 70 posts between 2011 and 2024, none is positive.

30 May 2016. “A thought-provoking piece on the use of commercial spyware against dissidents and journalists in the United Arab Emirates, and elsewhere too, presumably.”

29 December 2018. “In Yemen, the Saudis and Emiratis are not only fighting with American warplanes and Yemeni militias: they are also using Sudanese child soldiers. Essential reporting by @ddknyt in Khartoum.”

7 March 2019. “The blackout on information about Dubai’s economy means no one knows how it is doing, which probably means it is doing badly.”

27 September 2024. “This week, President Biden met the leader of the United Arab Emirates, the main backer of the RSF, which is committing atrocities. Mr Biden praised the United Arab Emirates as a nation ‘always looking forward’, without offering a word of public criticism for enabling ethnic cleansing.”

What future for journalistic impartiality?

While recent investigations have exposed direct forms of corruption, the subtler influences that shape certain journalists or opinion leaders remain underexplored. The case of Declan Walsh illustrates this mechanism of congruence of interests: a lasting bias born of an implicit alignment between a journalistic reading of events and the interests of a state.

It is also from this angle that Qatar’s relatively high 2026 ranking by RSF should be examined. The RSF ranking does not merely reflect an institutional situation: it also reveals the strength of an international image patiently built over time. The funding and support provided by Doha to networks linked to the Muslim Brotherhood have paradoxically helped reinforce this image in some Western circles, presenting Qatar as a protector of political causes framed in terms of emancipation, mediation or pluralism.

Over time, this congruence of interests can shape how a country is perceived by major media outlets, and then by organisations that rely on this information environment. As philosopher Edward Wasserman has observed, conflicts of interest are often more diffuse and complex than traditional ethical codes acknowledge. This is why media organisations, like RSF, must ensure greater transparency, so that carefully constructed reputations do not obscure the reality of violations of press freedom.

Read also:

Qatar : un émirat puissant et fragile

Le classement RSF face aux angles morts du monde non occidental

L’Arabie saoudite et les Émirats arabes unis : les ambitions de la puissance

Soudan : la Turquie et les Émirats à couteaux tirés